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When the Edo shogunate implemented mari-
time prohibitions (kaikin) in the 1630s, it marked 
the beginning of a historical era wherein the sho-
guns strictly regulated Japan's contact with the 
outside world.  In pre-Meiji Japanese history, it 
represented one of the few moments when such 
hegemons, whether in Kyoto, Kamakura or, in 
this case, Edo, were powerful enough to usurp the 
prerogatives of coastal domains in Kyushu or 
such port cities as Sakai, and channel foreign 
contact through the center.  The shoguns prohib-
ited local state and non-state interests from for-
mulating independent foreign agendas, sponsor-
ing religious exchange, and conducting overseas 
trade without authorization.  As the new histori-
ography on the topic argues, it was a powerful 
assertion of the realm-wide legitimacy of the new 
regime in Edo, as well as an obvious birthplace of 
an early "national" consciousness among many 
Japanese and a critical element in the formation 
of what historians call Japan's early modern pe-
riod, or kinsei 
This essay attempts to create an updated narra-
tive of early modern Japan's foreign relations and 
frontier experiences, one that incorporates previ-
ously neglected topics and highlights the new 
directions explored by this vibrant sub-field of 
Japanese studies.  This narrative suggests the 
selective exclusion of certain foreigners from 
Japanese soil should be viewed as a proactive 
engagement of the outside world, one which re-
quired a fairly sophisticated understanding of the 
religions and cultures of trading partners and the 
implications of exchange with them.  That is to 
say, the Edo shogunate actively sought to author-
ize or prohibit certain domains from conducting 
trade unilaterally, to debrief repatriated individu-
                                                 
1  Originally, this essay appeared as a conference 
paper for "Early Modern Japanese Studies: The State of 
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greatly from the suggestions of the participants. 
als, to craft diplomatic ceremonies so that they 
bolstered Tokugawa authority, to defend border-
lands from invasions and uprisings, and to rigidly 
scrutinize the implications of the importation of 
new technologies and ideologies from around the 
globe.  The Edo shogunate's stance toward the 
outside world, as this narrative portrays it, was a 
loosely knit fabric of political and cultural as-
sumptions about foreign affairs and prejudices 
about the outside world, not to mention real fears 
of events unfolding in Asia, fears motivated by 
the Jurchen-Tartar unification wars, the Manchu 
conquest of Ming China, Ainu insurrection, and 
European expansion.  In short, Edo shoguns 
wove together the threads of military violence, 
ideological containment, political legitimacy, 
identity formation, cultural arrogance, individual 
paranoia, and the economics of foreign trade 
when crafting their approach to dealing with the 
outside world. 
In the first section, entitled "Kultur Politik," I 
draw on the scholarship of Jurgis Elisonas, Her-
man Ooms, and others to paint a portrait of 
Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea and China.  Even 
though a gruesome failure, Hideyoshi's invasion 
needs to be viewed within the context of the 
process of state consolidation and border forma-
tion in the beginning decades of the early modern 
period.  Second, in "Diplomacy," I explore the 
pioneering work of Ronald Toby, as well as 
Gregory Smits and others, to illustrate how the 
Tokugawa regime used diplomacy to legitimize 
its authority both at home and abroad.  Third, in 
"Diplomatic Sham," I look briefly at the critique 
of Toby's work articulated by Jurgis Elisonas in 
The Cambridge History of Japan, and then, in an 
attempt to mediate this dispute, I project both 
Toby's and Elisonas' main arguments against the 
backdrop of observations made by Engelbert 
Kaempfer in the seventeenth century.   In the 
fourth section, "Others," I survey new research on 
the birth of an early modern identity for Japanese, 
one which positioned foreign peoples as "others" 
in the creation of ethnic boundaries, political bor-
ders, and notions of a Japanese "self."  In this 
context, as Toby, David Howell, and Tessa Mor-
ris-Suzuki argue, foreign "others" served to bol-
ster a sense of a Japanese "self" in an otherwise 
fragmented political and social environment 
where most Nihonjin (a term that people of the 




early modern period seldom used outside discus-
sions of things foreign) delineated identities 
along patrilineal, domainal, regional, or status 
lines.  Under the Edo shogunate, it was in the 
realm of foreign contact that the dominant ethnic 
group of the present-day Japanese Archipelago, 
the people we view as "Japanese," best under-
stood themselves to be just that, Nihonjin. 
The fifth section, entitled "People," looks at 
multiethnic interaction within the Japanese 
Archipelago's most ambiguous spaces.  As 
Smits demonstrates, Ryukyu Islanders possessed 
more agency in their own cultural assimilation 
than previously thought.  In a fascinating twist, 
even following the invasion of the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, Satsuma and Edo officials preserved 
Ryukyuan foreignness, or place as "other," in 
order to keep trade with China alive, while at the 
same time Ryukyuan ideologues, such as Sai On, 
emulated Japan, a country they believed to be 
exemplary in the Confucian world.  To the north, 
the intensification of trade between Ainu and 
Matsumae domain led to the emergence of such 
charismatic chiefs as Shakushain, who, in 1669, 
waged a bloody war against Japanese after 
forging a pan-Ainu alliance to expel Japanese 
from the southern tip of the Oshima Peninsula.  
And, at Deshima, the small islet near Nagasaki, 
the experiences of Engelbert Kaempfer support 
the notion that Japan, because of the shogunate's 
fear of Christianity, had closed its doors, 
particularly at the level of interpersonal 
interaction, during the early modern period.  I 
argue that these three figures caution against 
using foreigners as simply "others" either in a 
cultural anthropological sense or to generalize 
about Japan's relationship with all foreigners.  
That is to say, just as Shakushain fought against 
what he viewed as an expanding Japan to the 
north, Kaempfer was confronted by an inward 
looking and, not to put too fine a point on it, 
paranoid society, one which basically staged 
diplomatic conduct in the name of domestic 
politics. 
The sixth section, called "Place," investigates 
the interdependency of Japan's domestic economy, 
overseas commerce, and the ecology. As Toby, 
Howell, and Robert Innes argue, Tokugawa for-
eign relations had an important impact on the 
domestic economy by fueling market growth, and 
hence sparking technological innovations in min-
ing, fishery development, and other industries.  
In the case of Ezo, Japanese markets and Matsu-
mae trade policy led to regional depletions of 
deer numbers in Ezo and undermined the ability 
of Ainu to subsist independently.  The economic 
intrusion into Ezo also witnessed the introduction 
of deadly contagions--as European advancement 
did in "virgin soil" populations around the world 
in the form of what Alfred Crosby calls "ecologi-
cal imperialism"2 -- exposing the implications of 
Japan's move into new epidemiological terrain. 
As this introduction suggests, a fair amount has 
been written on Japanese early modern foreign 
relations and frontiers in recent years, and so not 
all of it can be discussed in this essay.  (For this 
reason, a fairly comprehensive bibliography has 
been included in this volume.)  I focus mainly 
on historical writings that I see as pushing the 
boundaries of this subfield, writings that have 
reshaped the ways we look at the early modern 
period in particular and Japan in general. 
 
Kultur Politik 
Mary Elizabeth Berry argues in her political 
biography Hideyoshi that in the closing years of 
the sixteenth century, the second great unifier 
crafted what she refers to as a "federal" state from 
the remnants of the late medieval polity. Through 
a variety of political and personal devises, 
Hideyoshi linked powerful warring states lords 
(sengoku daimyo), rulers who only decades be-
fore had viewed their domains as semi-
independent states (kokka), to the center in Kyoto, 
and thereby extended his authority over the tradi-
tional provinces of the realm.3  By the 1590s, 
Hideyoshi extended this vision of unification 
even further, and orchestrated the failed invasion 
of Korea and Ming China. To contextualize this 
invasion, we must start by looking briefly at the 
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late medieval period.  This fact might seem ob-
vious to those who study pre-modern Japan.  
But all too often, the early modern period serves 
as a kind of preface to discussions of Japan's 
modern period--an epochal "straw man" posi-
tioned to show just how fast Japan modernized 
and industrialized in the late nineteenth century--
when the birth of the Edo shogunate also repre-
sented the termination of the chaotic medieval 
period and the emergence of a more perfected 
form of feudalism.  The invasion of Korea (as 
cruel and ill-fated as it was) was an offshoot of 
these political developments. 
At the outset, there was no "Christian century" 
in Japan at this time. With only about 130,000 
converts in 1579, the height of missionary activ-
ity and only eight years before the first expulsion 
edicts issued by Hideyoshi, what C. R. Boxer saw 
as the "Christian century" was in fact the terminal 
decades of the Era of the Warring States and the 
primordial beginnings of early modernity in Ja-
pan.4  What Boxer exposed was that the late 
medieval period witnessed intense spiritual ex-
ploration by many Japanese, no doubt a response 
to endemic warfare and the "culture of lawless-
ness" that gripped the late medieval years.5  Af-
ter the Onin War (1467-77), the Ashikaga sho-
gunate had basically lost any semblance of con-
trol over the warring states lords of Kyushu, the 
greatest patrons of the new faith, and motivated 
for reasons of devotion, exotic magic, weapons 
technology, domestic ambitions, and access to 
foreign markets, some gladly accommodated the 
early missionaries of the sixteenth and early sev-
enteenth centuries.6  By 1587, however, Hideyo-
shi had become alarmed.  Not because of too 
many converts, but rather because the hegemon 
learned that Christian lords reportedly oversaw 
forced conversions of retainers and commoners, 
that they had garrisoned the city of Nagasaki, that 
they participated in the slave trade, and (appar-
                                                 
4  George Elison, Deus Destroyed: The Image of 
Christianity in Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1973), 54 and 63. 
5 On the "culture of lawlessness," see Mary Elizabeth 
Berry, The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 11-54. 
6 On the "Christian Century," see C. R. Boxer, The 
Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967). 
ently offending Hideyoshi's Buddhist sentiments) 
that they allowed the slaughter of horses and 
oxen for food.7  With the San Felipe Incident of 
1596, moreover, Hideyoshi's resolve hardened 
considerably, and he undoubtedly viewed Christi-
anity as a threat to the realm.  "I have received 
information that in your kingdoms the promulga-
tion of the law [i.e., Christianity] is a trick and 
deceit by which you overcome other kingdoms," 
he wrote in a letter to the Philippines in reply to 
the embassy led by Navarrete Fajardo in 1597.  
Christian missionaries, in Hideyoshi's mind, rep-
resented the first wave of European imperialism.8  
The expulsion of these missionaries, therefore, 
needs be viewed as a first step in centering con-
trol over foreign affairs in Kyoto and the stepping 
up of an ideological campaign designed to articu-
late Hideyoshi's legitimacy to rule "all under 
heaven," or the East Asian notion of tenka. 
Hideyoshi, taking a page out of the mission-
ary's own handbook, began to fantasize about his 
own vision of religion as a means to articulate a 
world hierarchy that legitimized overseas con-
quest.  Herman Ooms, elaborating on the role of 
religion and thought, illustrates that Hideyoshi, in 
letters to the Portuguese Viceroy of Indies in Gao 
(1591) and the governor-general of the Philip-
pines, explained that Buddhism in India and Con-
fucianism in China both spoke of the same dei-
ties: the kami of Japan's Shinto.  Therefore, it 
stood to reason that Hideyoshi's Japan had reli-
gious justification to physically, not just meta-
physically, extend its power over the entire 
known civilized world.  It was, as Ooms con-
cludes, Hideyoshi's version of kultur politik. 9  
The invasion of Korea, in other words, imple-
mented a broader spiritual unity that already ex-
isted in Hideyoshi's imagination, albeit with Ja-
pan--shinkoku, or the Land of the Gods--as the 
sacred center.  Hideyoshi's reorganization of 
foreign relations, then, was not necessarily, as 
Elisonas submits, "a matured antecedent to the 
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8  Michael Cooper, Rodrigues the Interpreter: An 
Early Jesuit in Japan and China (New York: Weatherhill, 
1974), 160. 
9  Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology: Early 
Constructs, 1570-1680 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 46. 




Tokugawa construction, Sakoku," but rather a 
form of sixteenth-century Japanese expansionism, 
interwoven with a program of domestic pacifica-
tion and legitimation, and rooted in nativist tradi-
tions of Japan as a divine land.10 
Armed with this newly fashioned world order, 
Hideyoshi launched his infamous attack on the 
Korean Peninsula.  The invasion, skillfully nar-
rated by Elisonas, resulted in Japanese defeat. 
Elisonas' moving account of Japan's "sanguinary 
excesses" during the invasion, the utterly horrific 
atrocities inflicted against Koreans of all stripes, 
ranks among the most disturbing scholarship on 
Japan.  On the one hand, the lurid 1597 threats 
by Japanese warlords to mass murder Korean 
officials and farmers illustrates that Japanese ar-
mies made few, if any, distinctions between com-
batants and noncombatants.  The Japanese col-
lection of pickled noses, on the other hand, when 
such domainal contingents as Kikkawa Hiroie's 
and Nabeshima Katsushige's boasted the collec-
tion of some 23,794 noses in about two months, 
remains inexplicable even by modern standards.  
The Chosen nichinichiki (Korean days), the work 
of a Buddhist priest named Keinen, tells of Ko-
rean slaves being led by Japanese slave traders.  
In a section translated by Elisonas, Keinen wrote, 
 
Among the many kinds of merchants who 
have come over from Japan are traders in 
human beings, who follow in the train of 
the troops and buy up men and women, 
young and old alike.  Having tied these 
people together with ropes about the neck, 
they drive them along before them; those 
who can no longer walk are made to run 
with prods or blows of the stick from be-
hind.  The sight of the fiends and man-
devouring demons who torment sinners in 
hell must be like this, I thought.11 
 
Simultaneous to orchestrating these hellish poli-
cies in Korea, Hideyoshi also extended Japan's 
northern border to include the Kakizaki family 
                                                 
10 Elison, Deus Destroyed, 117. 
11 Jurgis Elisonas, "The Inseparable Trinity: Japan's 
Relations with China and Korea," in The Cambridge 
History of Japan, Vol. 4, ed. John Whitney Hall 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 290-93. 
(the Matsumae family after 1599) of southern 
Ezo (present-day Hokkaido).  In 1593, when 
Kakizaki Yoshihiro met with Hideyoshi at Na-
goya in Hizen Province, the staging area for the 
invasion of Korea, they discussed the possibility 
of a northern route through Orankai (north of the 
Korean Peninsula near Manchuria, home of the 
Tartar and Jurchen) onto the continent.  Maps in 
Hideyoshi's possession, and earlier maps attrib-
uted to Matteo Ricci, illustrated Ezo (that is, the 
island of Hokkaido) as part of North Asia.  It 
was widely rumored, moreover, that the Jurchen 
and Tartar carried on trade with the Ainu (at this 
time called Ezojin).  Kato Kiyomasa, after at-
tacking Hamgyong-do, crossed into Orankai 
where he captured Goto Jiro, a Japanese native 
from Fukuyama (at this time only a fort, but later 
the castle town of the Matsumae family).  He 
had been living in the region for twenty years, 
spoke both Korean and Japanese, and told Kiyo-
masa that Fukuyama, in southern Ezo, was "close 
to Orankai [and hence Korea]."12 
Chronicles describe Hideyoshi, after his meet-
ing with Yoshihiro, as "extremely excited."  Ob-
viously, the reasons for his excitement were two-
fold.  First, Hideyoshi sought to use Ezo as a 
possible northern route for his invasion of the 
continent.  Second, he sought to position the 
Kakizaki family as a bulwark against Jurchen and 
Tartar unification wars that were, according to 
descriptions offered by missionary Luis Frois, 
underway in Orankai, and that he and others be-
lieved might spill over into Ezo and possibly Ja-
pan.  It was foreign policy based on realm secu-
rity, much like his expulsion of European mis-
sionaries was motivated (at least in part) by fears 
of imperialism.  To bolster Kakizaki authority, 
Hideyoshi granted the Kakizaki the exclusive 
rights to levy shipping duties in Ezo (funayaku): 
Kakizaki ports henceforth became the hubs of the 
region's economic activity.  Implicit within this 
arrangement was the fact that Kakizaki lords be-
came obliged to recognize Hideyoshi's authority 
to grant such shipping duties, duties subsequently 
recognized by Japan's sometimes cantankerous 
political community.  When Yoshihiro returned 
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to Ezo after the 1593 meeting, chronicles trumpet 
that he gathered Ainu "from east and west" and 
read to them, in translation, Hideyoshi's vermil-
lion-seal order granting the Kakizaki the right to 
levy shipping duties.  If Ainu failed to observe 
these orders, the chronicle continues, a force of 
100,000 warriors would be sent by the hegemon 
to crush them.  With this, "Hideyoshi had ex-
tended his control beyond the confines of the tra-
ditional provinces of the realm, which suggests 
that not all his overseas ambitions ended in utter 
disaster."13 
Recent writings, in other words, view Hideyo-
shi's policy toward the continent less as simply a 
bungled invasion of Korea that ended in the later 
Tokugawa withdrawal from the international 
arena, but rather as part of a broader process of 
state consolidation, the conversion of military 
power to political legitimacy, border demarcation, 
realm wide security, and the continuing formation 
of a Japan-centered epistemology in the form of 
shinkoku.  In short, Hideyoshi's foreign policy 
set the stage for a proactive engagement of the 
Eurasian continent designed to strengthen domes-
tic authority and, unless you view events from the 
singular perspective of Jesuits and Franciscan 
friars on ships departing Nagasaki, moved to pro-
tect Japan, a country he understood to be the sa-




The Tokugawa stance toward foreign affairs 
was initially shaped by Hideyoshi's invasion of 
Korea, and so, Ronald Toby, in his pioneering 
State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, 
begins with a discussion of how the Edo sho-
gunate attempted to patch up relations with Korea 
and China.  Following the death of Hideyoshi, 
writes Toby, "the most urgent diplomatic business 
at hand was what in modern terms would be 
called the normalization of relations with East 
Asia."  In concrete terms, this meant a with-
drawal of troops from the peninsula; offering 
paddy lands to Tsushima to raise its status so that 
it could, under the protocol of the day, enter 
commercial relations with Pusan; and playing 
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host to a 1607 Korean embassy to "normalize" 
relations to the benefit of both countries, when a 
forged letter from King S? njo was given to sho-
gun Hidetada.  The 1607 embassy, argues Toby, 
"functioned to the advantage of both [Japan and 
Korea] as legitimating propaganda for the bakufu, 
and as a channel of political and strategic intelli-
gence on continental affairs, as the political foun-
dation for trade, and as one element in an emerg-
ing diplomatic manifestation of Japan's ideal vi-
sion of the structure of international order."14 
Supported by this new political foundation, 
foreign trade flourished among those domains 
that the shogun authorized to trade.  By the late 
seventeenth century, the profits from the private 
trade between Pusan and Tsushima domain, for 
example, exceeded 10,000 kan in silver, an 
amount, Toby notes, comparable to the nengu 
(annual tax) revenues of all but the largest early 
modern domains.15  This diplomatic "normaliza-
tion"--if such a term can be comfortably applied 
to conquest--also extended southward between 
the Ryukyu Islands and Satsuma domain.  In 
1609, Shimazu Iehisa, after receiving authoriza-
tion from Edo, invaded Ryukyu with a force of 
3,000 troops.16  Essentially, Satsuma then incor-
porated the Ryukyu Kingdom: it ruled over the 
islands, conducted cadastral surveys, and eventu-
ally claimed Ryukyu's kokudaka (assessed yield) 
as its own.17 
Gregory Smits, in Visions of Ryukyu, writes 
that Satsuma also proceeded to reinvent Ryu-
kyuan history in the form of a pledge, signed by 
King Sho Nei, that acknowledged Satsuma's his-
torical role in governing the islands.  Smits con-
cludes, "Satsuma's military power had trans-
formed Ryukyu's past."  From this point forward, 
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Bakufu (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; 
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15 Ibid., 39-40. 
16  George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an 
Island People (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 
1958), 156-60.  See also Toby, State and Diplomacy, 45. 
17  Toby, State and Diplomacy, 45-46.  See also 
Gregory Smits, Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology 
in Early-Modern Thought and Politics (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1999). 15-16. 




despite the creative resistance of such Ryukyuan 
figures as Tei Do, Satsuma oversaw the king-
dom's relations with China.  Among the Fifteen 
Injunctions given to the king of Ryukyu, one for-
bade "any merchant ship to sail from Ryukyu to a 
foreign country" without Satsuma's approval.  
Smits points out, however, that a conflict quickly 
broke out between shogunal and domainal offi-
cials over the administration of Ryukyu, a con-
flict that the Shimazu family ultimately lost.  In 
1613, Satsuma had sought to assimilate the is-
lands: one domainal order read that "[t]he various 
customs and practices of Ryukyu are not to differ 
from those of Japan."  However, three years 
later, Shimazu Iehisa reversed Satsuma policy, 
arguing, as Smits paraphrases, that "for Ryukyu 
to follow Satsuma in every way would be detri-
mental to Ryukyu's continued existence as a 
country."18  In time, Satsuma prohibited Ryukyu 
Islanders from wearing Japanese hairstyles and 
clothing.  The reason that Ryukyu needed "con-
tinued existence as a country," even after its con-
quest, was because the island kingdom was more 
useful as a foreign country in the Tokugawa dip-
lomatic order and more lucrative as a trading 
partner with China than it was as a newly assimi-
lated province. 
Toby also explains that in this competition be-
tween Satsuma and the shogunate over what to do 
with the conquered Ryukyu Islands, Edo won.  
In fact, between 1610 and 1850, Ryukyu kings, 
adorned in their intentionally preserved native 
and, more importantly, foreign garb, made 
twenty-one trips to Edo to visit the shogun.19  
Shogunal officials, moreover, manipulated these 
visits to serve as a powerful legitimizing tool for 
Tokugawa authority.  This fact, Toby submits, 
"should serve to lay to rest some of the miscon-
ceptions that exist about the direction of early 
Tokugawa foreign policy: the bakufu actively 
sought contact with Korea and the rest of Japan's 
international environment, pulling back only 
when it perceived real danger."20  In brief, im-
mediately following the military victory at Seki-
gahara, the shogunate took an active interest in 
manipulating audiences in Edo, disputing sino-
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19 Toby, State and Diplomacy, 48-49. 
20 Ibid., 81. 
centric calendars and era names, and crafting its 
own tally trade with China.  In relations with 
China, the shogunate invented new diplomatic 
titles such as Nihonkoku taikun, Great Prince of 
Japan, rather than simply "king," which smacked 
of the Sinocentric order, because it correctly un-
derstood these aspects of political and diplomatic 
life to be an important part of extending its he-
gemony over the realm and bolstering its prestige 
abroad. 
In this way, while foreign envoys visited Edo, 
ceremony was carefully constructed to create a 
Japan-centered world.  As Toby explains, "the 
bakufu sought a set of protocols and norms for 
the conduct of foreign relations which would be 
acceptable to a sufficient number of foreign states 
to sustain the levels of trade and cultural contact 
deemed essential, and which might constitute a 
symbolic mirror of the structure of an ideal 'world 
order' of Japanese fantasy."21   Specific diplo-
matic language, the manipulation of spatial hier-
archy, the strict use of a Japanese-based schedule 
of ambassadorial visits, employing popular art as 
propaganda in the form of the Edo zu byobu 
[1637], ritualizing gift giving, and pushing no-
tions of Japan as the "central kingdom" and for-
eigners as "barbarians"--or the ka'i chitsujo--all 
served to legitimize Tokugawa authority and set a 
standard for realm wide diplomatic practice. 
In Matsumae domain's "barbarian audiences" 
with Ainu, for example, officials employed these 
realmwide diplomatic practices.  Kakizaki 
Orindo's Matsumae jonai nenju gyoji (The annual 
events of Matsumae Castle), which includes a 
section on the protocol used in Ainu visits to Fu-
kuyama Castle--visits called uimamu, a term, as 
David Howell observes, that was a reinvention of 
a native Ainu form of greeting22--illustrates that 
these Ainu visits were meticulously constructed 
to assert the military power and political authority 
of the Matsumae family, and hence Japanese rule, 
on the northern border.  When Ainu participated 
in attendance at the castle, Kakizaki noted that 
the ceremony was held in the audience chamber, 
a room carefully adorned with the symbols of 
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Matsumae authority, including armor and hang-
ing curtains with the household crest.  Spatial 
hierarchy dramatized Japanese power, moreover: 
the domain lord occupied a raised section of the 
chamber while Ainu sat in the outer chamber.  A 
designated official mediated all edicts, while a 
translator made sure Ainu understood them.  
Even the gifts carried political nuances.  Ainu 
offered kenjobutsu, or gifts presented upward, 
while the lord presented kudasaremono, or gifts 
bestowed downward.  The goyoban, or master 
of ceremonies, then escorted Ainu elders to in-
spect the military hardware of the domain.  This 
protocol shared several similarities with the sev-
enteenth-century visits to Edo by Korean and 
Ryukyuan embassies.23 
Only four decades after Sekigahara the sho-
gunate found itself confronted by a major for-
eign-policy issue on the Eurasian continent.  
With the Manchu conquest of China, Edo realized 
what Toby calls (and all Japan specialists should 
recognize as) a manifest truth: "Japan is in Asia, 
and cannot isolate herself from it."  To varying 
degrees, the shogunate, or domains under its au-
thority, assisted continental allies in their fight 
against Manchu takeover.  In 1627, anticipating 
a Manchu push, shogun Iemitsu ordered that 
gunpowder and swords, and possibly some fire-
arms, be sent to Korea.  Later, in 1645, Ming 
loyalist Cui Zhi, through the Nagasaki magistracy 
(bugyo) requested shogunal assistance in fighting 
the Qing.  "[D]ozens of embassies," Toby ex-
plains, followed, all looking for Tokugawa aid.24  
However, the absence of a Ming state, the poor 
prospects of Ming pretenders, and other factors 
all pointed to a cautious stance by the shogunate.  
Finally, with the defeat of Zheng Zhilong, any 
hope of driving the Manchus out of China died, 
and shogun Iemitsu chose to stay out of the con-
flict.  Still, by favoring anti-Qing merchants and 
serving as a haven for Ming loyalists, Japan had 
taken sides in a continental matter. 
 
Diplomatic Sham 
Jurgis Elisonas, in The Cambridge History of 
Japan, leveled the first critique of Toby's thesis, 
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arguing that Korea and the Ryukyu Kingdom, the 
two countries with which Japan conducted so 
called "diplomatic relations"--that is, tsushin, as 
opposed to tsusho, or "commercial relations"--
were either reluctant participants in Japan's 
staged diplomatic sham or not really foreign 
countries at all.   Turning the East Asian per-
spective against Toby and others, moreover, Eli-
sonas points out that the model for the Tokugawa 
policy of kaikin, "maritime prohibitions," was 
Ming China, a country that, Elisonas insists, 
"constructed the model of an isolationist policy."  
"The means and motives of what the Chinese of 
the Ming period called hai-chin (J: kaikin), or 
maritime prohibitions," writes Elisonas, "were 
analogons to those of the Tokugawa period's sa-
koku directives."25  Hence, the very spirit and 
historical precedent of the notion of kaikin, 
(strictly speaking, of course, there were no "sa-
koku directives"), spawned from the very East 
Asian context that Toby and others emphasize as 
being so important. 
Elisonas continues by pointing out that Korea, 
"the only foreign country with which the Toku-
gawa regime maintained diplomatic relations," 
sent only twelve official embassies to Japan dur-
ing the entire Tokugawa period, and that the first 
and most famous of these, the 1636 mission to 
visit shogun Iemitsu and the deified Ieyasu at the 
Nikko mausoleum, was in fact a "diplomatic mis-
sion" rather than a "return embassy," thus hardly 
constituting a tributary visit as understood by the 
rules of the East Asian diplomatic order.  As for 
the Ryukyu Kingdom, between 1634 and 1806, 
the Ryukyu king dispatched some fifteen embas-
sies to visit Tokugawa shoguns.  Elisonas insists, 
however, that Ryukyu "could scarcely be called a 
foreign country insofar as Japan was concerned.  
Ryukyu was not an independent or even an 
autonomous state: it had been conquered in 1609 
by the Shimazu and was no more than a depend-
ency of the daimyo of Kagoshima, whom the ba-
kufu enfeoffed with Ryukyu just as it did with 
Satsuma and Osumi."26 
Elisonas is correct about Ryukyu.  Nonethe-
less, remarks made by the German doctor Engel-
bert Kaempfer, whose seventeenth-century his-
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tory of Japan Beatrice Bodart-Bailey recently 
translated under the title Kaempfer's Japan, illus-
trate the complexity of the relationship between 
the Ryukyu Kingdom and Japan, as well as some 
noteworthy comments about Chosen (Korea) not 
mentioned by Elisonas but that support his cri-
tique.  "Some centuries ago," Kaempfer wrote, 
the Ryukyu Islands "submitted to the king of Sat-
suma as a result of military force, and he keeps 
them subservient with bugyo, or commissioners 
and magistrates, strong military commanders, and 
guards."  Kaempfer continued, "Even though 
they are not considered foreigners, but to some 
extent as Japanese subjects, they are, nevertheless, 
treated as foreigners and outsiders when it comes 
to trade." In the case of Chosen, Kaempfer re-
marked in his section on "Japanese Possessions 
Overseas" that, after Hideyoshi's invasion, 
"Ieyasu had the Koreans appear at court every 
three years with a delegation as proof of their 
submission.  After that, they slowly came again 
under the sway of the Tartars and pushed the 
Japanese occupation to the furthest corner of their 
last province, which indeed is still subservient to 
the present Japanese ruler."  Kaempfer ex-
plained that the Tokugawa shogun "is happy to 
own no more than the Korean frontier as safety 
for his own country and has it guarded by the lord 
of Tsushima, who maintains a military guard of 
sixty people under the command of a bugyo.  
The Koreans are ordered to appear at court only 
at a time of shogunal succession to take an oath 
of loyalty to the new ruler."27 
Herein lies the crux of the debate between 
Toby and Elisonas.  If we follow Kaempfer's 
line that Ryukyu Islanders "are not considered 
foreigners," then we can accept the rather sharp 
critique of Toby leveled by Elisonas: "Japan had 
a government that barely pursued foreign rela-
tions at all."  That the "sham played with Ryu-
kyu enforced participation and the facsimile of a 
formal relationship in which Korea acquiesced 
sufficed to create for the bakufu its own interna-
tional order, in which Japan ranked first, even if it 
had to be prima in vacuo."28  Regarding Chosen, 
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although Elisonas never questioned its authentic-
ity as a foreign country in trade and diplomatic 
exchange, some Japanese historians, such as Ya-
mamoto Hirofumi, float the notion that southern 
Korea was part of the administrative frontiers of 
the early modern Japanese state or, as Kaempfer 
mentioned, that the shogun oversaw part of the 
Korean frontier "as safety for his own country."29  
Hence historians raise questions regarding even 
Chosen's authenticity as a real diplomatic partner. 
If we return to Kaempfer's earlier remarks, 
however, we learn that Ryukyuans were "treated 
as foreigners and outsiders when it comes to 
trade," which was, if we understand Kaempfer's 
use of the word "trade" to mean both economic 
and diplomatic exchange, precisely Toby's point.  
That is to say, the Tokugawa shoguns partly 
manufactured such foreigners to fit within its ver-
sion of diplomatic exchange to bolster its political 
power at home and abroad, even if such diplo-




By retelling a fascinating story from Ezo, 
David Howell demonstrates that Matsumae pol-
icy toward the Ainu shared similarities to the 
shogunal and, later, the Satsuma strategy of what 
might be called mandated difference toward the 
Ryukyu Islands.  That is, Ainu were, like the 
Ryukyuans, "treated as foreigners" by Matsumae 
domain, even when the status of their actual for-
eignness, at least in the area called Wajinchi 
(Japanese land) was less clear.  Howell points to 
an Ainu named Iwanosuke, of Kennichi village in 
Wajinchi, the Japanese occupied section of south-
ern Hokkaido, who was thoroughly assimilated to 
the everyday customs of Japanese life: he had a 
Japanese name, lived in a Japanese village, and 
wore his hair in a Japanese fashion.  During 
New Year's ceremonies, however, Iwanosuke un-
derwent what Howell calls a "curious metamor-
phosis."  "As a representative of the Ainu peo-
ple," writes Howell, Iwanosuke went to Fuku-
yama Castle to participate in an audience with the 
Matsumae lord.  Iwanosuke's metamorphosis 
was cast by contemporary Japanese observers as 
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a "remnant of old Ezo customs."  However, as 
Howell argues, the opposite was true: "Iwanosuke 
assumed what had become for him a false iden-
tity for reasons that had little to do with old Ainu 
customs and everything to do with the institutions 
of the Matsumae domain."30 
This invention of tradition and fabrication of 
foreignness, Howell points out, served several 
purposes.  Most pertinently, it demarcated "eth-
nic boundaries" which in turn served to establish 
"political boundaries."  At the same time, it cast 
the Japanese domination of the Ainu "in history 
and the 'timeless' traditions of Ainu culture."  
Howell observes of the Tokugawa shogunate that 
it "was the first regime in Japanese history to 
draw clear physical borders for itself."  Qualify-
ing this assertion, however, he continues that 
"rather than establish a dichotomy between Japan 
and the rest of the world, it surrounded itself with 
peripheral areas that were neither fully part of the 
polity nor completely independent of it."  How-
ell submits that this "spurred the formation of a 
Japanese identity even before the emergence of a 
modern nation-state in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury."31 
Similarly, Tessa Morris-Suzuki points out that 
even the assimilation policies aimed at the many 
"societies on the periphery" of the early modern 
polity "involved a sharpening of the official defi-
nition of what it meant to be Japanese."  Scruti-
nizing the place of the "frontier" in mapping out 
what was spatially "Japan," Morris-Suzuki asks 
important questions regarding "the whole way in 
which we deal with space in history."  "The eye 
of the historian," she writes, "tends to look for 
change over time rather than diversity across 
space."  Through investigating Japan's relation-
ship with its neighbors, Morris-Suzuki argues for 
a sensitivity to "spatial diversity" as well as 
"temporal change."32 
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Following an analysis of the 1713 Wakan san-
sai zue (An Illustrated Japanese-Chinese ency-
clopedia), Morris-Suzuki conjectures that the 
"feeling conveyed by this work is of a world 
made up of concentric circles of increasing 
strangeness, stretching almost infinitely outwards 
from a familiar centre."  She points out how this 
model was born from the ka'i chitsujo--or the 
model of the "civilized center" and "barbarian 
periphery"--although it remains not entirely clear 
whether Japan or China served as the hub in this 
first work (it being modeled after earlier Chinese 
encyclopedias).  Bruce Batten, though more 
concerned with comparative models of frontier 
and boundary creation, emphasizes a similar fron-
tier theme, albeit on a more state-centered level, 
in his Japanese-language history of premodern 
Japanese boundaries and frontiers.  Rather than 
identify "concentric circles of increasing strange-
ness" which stretched out from a "familiar cen-
tre," as Morris-Suzuki did, Batten draws on 
Robert Gilpin's state-centered model of "loss-of-
strength gradient," wherein premodern frontiers 
are defined by their distance from the political 
core and by their political strangeness.33 
Morris-Suzuki argues that in the late Toku-
gawa period, other popular encyclopedias drew 
on the increasingly important nativism of Mo-
toori Norinaga, "in which Japanese identity was 
defined in terms of spontaneous virtue and crea-
tivity, as opposed to the rigidity and sterility at-
tributed to Chinese learning," and the civilized 
hub was clearly identified by an "urbanized 
samurai encountering a group of Geisha in a city 
street."  "Moral rectitude" emerged as one of the 
defining characteristic of being a Japanese. 34  
Like Howell, Morris-Suzuki writes that the "cor-
nerstone" of the ka'i chitsujo was "the logic of 
difference," even if it was sometimes trumped up.  
She explains that the "relationship with the Ainu 
and the Ryukyu kingdom were important pre-
cisely because they represented the subordination 
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of foreign people to Japanese dominion.  Every-
thing about the relationship, therefore, had to be 
structured in such a way as to magnify the exotic 
character of the peripheral societies."  The em-
bassies dispatched to Edo from the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, for Morris-Suzuki, were an "extrava-
gant and elaborately staged dramatization of the 
logic of ka'i," or mandated difference.35 
Later, with late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth-century contact with European nations, 
Japan was forced to grapple with a modified no-
tion of the frontier.  Morris-Suzuki explains that 
Japan needed to adjust to the idea of a frontier as 
a "line marking the boundary between one nation 
and another, instead of the idea of a series of 
frontiers marking gradually increasing degrees of 
difference."  (Pointing to a later transformation 
of frontiers to national boundaries, Batten picks 
up this theme as well, arguing that actual bounda-
ries failed to emerge in the north until around 
1855 with the Shimoda Treaty between Japan and 
Russia.36)  But for Morris-Suzuki, evidence of 
boundary creation earlier than 1855 include the 
formulation of an assimilationist discourse in 
Japan, a discourse that forced Edo officials and 
intellectuals to sharpen their definition of what 
was, and what was not, the Japanese realm.  The 
geographer Honda Toshiaki, for example, follow-
ing the intrusion of Russian trappers into the 
North Pacific, believed that Ainu should be made 
more Japanese.37  "[W]e must establish a mutual 
frontier between Japan and other countries and 
create a fortress to withstand foreign enemies," he 
wrote on one occasion.  Thus, even the slow 
absorption of "peripheral societies" into the early 
modern polity (and hence the clean delineation of 
borders between Japan and other nations) further 
helped clarify what it meant to be Japanese.38  
For Morris-Suzuki and Batten, one of the hall-
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marks of modernity in Japan was the transforma-
tion of once "concentric circles of increasing 
strangeness" or "loss-of-strength gradient" ema-
nating from the political center to political bor-
ders and the ultimate assimilation of foreign peo-
ples who found themselves living within these 
newly drawn lines. 
In 1857, in a different kind of example of this 
spatial and ethnic demarcation of the boundaries 
of the early modern polity, the Edo shogunate 
sponsored medical treatment and Jennerian 
smallpox vaccinations for all Japanese and Ainu 
in Ezo.  With this policy, shogunal officials, 
working through the Hakodate bugyo, placed 
medical treatment and smallpox vaccinations in 
the same context as the other forms of assimila-
tion discussed by Howell and Morris-Suzuki.  
State-sponsored medicine in Ezo "sought to trans-
form the place of the Ainu, even at the level of 
the individual Ainu body, in relation to the early 
modern Japanese polity."  Like the Foucauldian 
relationship between public medicine and state 
power that emerged in modern Europe, medicine 
in Ezo was employed by the shogunate to protect 
what it viewed as "a newly acquired appendage 
of the body politic--or something to be integrated 
into the national whole--as well as demarcate, at 
the level of the individual body, the borders of the 
Japanese state in the north."39 
Beginning in 1799, with the Tokugawa attain-
der of lands and administrative powers once un-
der Matsumae control, officials in Ezo mandated 
that Ainu infected with disease report to adminis-
trative posts throughout Ezo.  In other words, in 
the same context as ordering Ainu to change their 
hairstyles, conform to Japanese customary norms, 
use the Japanese language, or to abandon the 
practice of polygamy, Ainu were forced, via sho-
gunal policy, to recognize Japanese-based notions 
of health and medical culture.  The ultimate 
manifestation of this was the 1857 vaccination 
project.  Physicians on Tokugawa payroll set out 
to vaccinate people increasingly thought to be 
wards of the early modern state, even if they were 
ethnic Ainu, and conscious decisions were made 
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at the outset about who and where to vaccinate.  
In short, in the arena of public medicine, the Edo 
shogunate consciously mapped out the ethnic, 
spatial, and administrative boundaries of the early 
modern body politic before the rise of the modern 
nation-state.40 
The emergence of an early modern Japanese 
identity, and the delineation of modern state 
boundaries, was not confined to the political 
arena, but extended into the popular conscious-
ness as well.  As Toby illustrates in several arti-
cles on the topic, images of "foreign others," ones 
usually built on strongly held, and sometimes 
state-sponsored, stereotypes -- or "codes of 
Other"41 -- of Koreans and other outsiders, gal-
vanized the imagination of urban commoners in 
Japan.  He writes that along the routes of Ko-
rean embassies, "rich and poor; courtier, daimyo, 
and commoner, competed--and paid dearly--for 
the best vantage point from which to watch the 
passage of an embassy."  To preserve and profit 
from these embassies, "artists and printmakers 
recorded virtually every stage of a Korean em-
bassy's progress through Japan, from first landfall 
in Tsushima, to passage by ship through the 
Inland Sea and riverboat up the Yodo River, and 
overland through Kyoto, and along the highways 
to Edo, and occasionally beyond."  Toby's 
highly original analysis of these visual sources 
illustrates that the tropes of alterity (or "codes of 
Other") employed by Japanese served to affirm 
what it meant to be Japanese.  "Through reen-
actment and representation," writes Toby,  "the 
alien embassy became permanent and omnipres-
ent, an enduring element in contemporary culture.  
It was an instrumentality for the construction of 
'Korea', and implicitly of all 'others', in Japanese 
culture, and by extension it was a means for cre-
ating 'Japan'."42  
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The symbolic meaning of Korean embassies 
also altered the nature of the Tokugawa status 
system.  When townspeople undertook their 
own Tojin gyoretsu, or foreigners parades, and 
crafted Chosen yama, or Korean floats, common 
people asserted an "identity radically different 
from that sanctioned by official social ideology," 
and by masquerading as foreigners, they "li-
censed themselves temporarily to step outside the 
tightly controlled behavioral requirements of role 
and status demanded of them by the norms of 
their society."  In other words, participants 
stepped from the realm of the Japanese self, and 
its implicit rigid status categories, to the realm of 
stereotyped-ethnic alterity, appropriating the 
"codes of Other" which remained alien enough to 
serve as a commonly perceived liminal space for 
escaping the officially endorsed social norms of 
the day.  Common people, Toby concludes, 
masquerading as foreigners, brought the political 
center, that lavish capital where embassies visited, 
to themselves, thus "asserting their own, commu-
nal parity with the shogun."43 
Ultimately, however, confronting foreigners 
forced early modern Japanese to, as Toby ex-
plains, "reorder not only their cosmology, but 
their imaginings and imaging of the range of hu-
man variation that they encountered in the wake 
of Columbus."44  The greater the number of out-
side people Japanese witnessed in the early mod-
ern period, the less blanket terms used to describe 
this outside world, such as Sangoku, or the Three 
Realms, remained meaningful.  Prior to what 
Toby describes as the "Xavierian moment," the 
tripartite framework Japanese employed to de-
scribe the outside world was the Three Realms of 
Wagachu ("Our Land," or Japan), Shintan or Kara 
(usually "China," but also other continental peo-
ples such as Koreans), and Tenjiku (rendered as 
"India," but more of a theologic term that meant 
"Land of the Buddha").  Toby writes that for 
early-sixteenth-century Japanese, "the real world 
consisted largely of two possible identities: peo-
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ple of 'Our Land', and people from China--
comprising 'the Continent', with which there was 
a long history of contact and commerce." 45  
(Perhaps for this reason, when Kaempfer traveled 
to Edo, he was called Tojin, or Chinese, by 
onlookers.46)  After the 1550s, however, in the 
wake of the "Xavierian moment," Japanese were, 
argues Toby, "inundated with a bewildering array 
of new-found Others," people who "came in hith-
erto inconceivable variety of colors, shapes, hir-
sutenesses, and habiliments."  These were the 
people not of Sangoku, but rather of the more 
broadly cast Bankoku, or "Myriad Realms."47 
The notion of Bankoku required a new way of 
construing the world, one riddled with unfamiliar 
geographies and taxonomies, demanding that 
Japanese artists, who rendered these new cartog-
raphies visually, move beyond distinguishing 
between Japanese and others, now distinguishing 
Japanese from among a vast variety of human 
kinds--jinrui.  In his analysis of such works as 
the 1645 Shoho bankoku jinbutsu zu (Shoho illus-
tration of the peoples of the myriad realms), Toby 
describes a "groping toward an 'anthropology' of 
sorts," or what he later refers to as the "anthro-
pology of representation."  Moreover, Toby cau-
tions against dismissing this type of early modern 
"anthropology of representation" as overly imag-
ined by pointing out that "European 'knowledge' 
of the foreign was not consistently empirical, 
either. . .."  The principal medium for represent-
ing foreigners became the visual image and, as 
Toby argues, "each image was a specimen, much 
like museum dioramas or specimen villages at a 
World's Fair."48  This explosion of anthropos in 
the Japanese world view engendered new knowl-
edge of "other" and "self," and visual sources, 
unlike texts, provide a rare glimpse into this 
world of the early modern imagining and imaging 
of the outside world. 
 
People 
Focus on the formation of an early modern 
identity, one which required casting foreigners as 
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"others," has had its dangerous interpretive pit-
falls.  Fine tuning this notion of an early modern 
Japanese identity has meant casting foreign peo-
ples, both real and imagined, as reflexive or re-
flective "others," with little or no historical 
agency.  More often than not, such foreigners 
and the places where they lived have served the 
purposes of either Japan or those who write its 
history, which is, of course, a biased vantage 
point from which to view any country's foreign 
relations and frontier experiences.  New re-
search reveals that relations with foreigners not 
only transformed the Japanese idea of self, but 
that these foreigners themselves--the "others" 
with whom the Japanese interacted--also wit-
nessed political and cultural changes as a result of 
their contact with early modern Japan.  Outside 
important observations related to missionaries, or 
brief discussions of seventeenth-century Korean 
politics, this point has only been made by Eliso-
nas, Smits, and Bodart-Bailey, but nonetheless it 
should be considered central to our discussion.  
Really, this lesson is simple yet critical: vantage 
point, or the temporal, spatial, and human per-
spective from which history is construed, shapes 
our rendering of the past.   
When Boxer and Elisonas argued that Japan 
was isolated under the Tokugawa regime--the 
"sakoku directives"--their vantage point and tem-
poral site stemmed from European experiences in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.  
Of course, for these Europeans, Japan was a 
"closed country," and so not surprisingly, histori-
ans most reliant on this European perspective 
most passionately pushed the sakoku thesis.  
Reinier Hesselink, who actually bridges the Japa-
nese and European perspectives, has most re-
cently made this point in Prisoners from Nambu.  
In July 1643, when Japanese authorities from the 
northeastern domain of Morioka (overseen by the 
Nanbu family) cleverly lured ashore and then 
incarcerated ten crew members of the Breskens, a 
yacht out of Batavia that Dutch officials had dis-
patched along with the fluyt Castricom, these 
Dutch sailors correctly came to the conclusion 
that Japan was a country run by paranoid and at 
times even sadistic rulers.  What else could they 
possibly have concluded as they watched as the 
Christian hunter Inoue Masashige and others sub-
jected Catholic missionaries to horrific tortures 




such as the anatsurushi (the legendary "pit tor-
ture")?49  By contrast, it stands to reason that 
historians illustrating the pervasiveness of East 
Asian contact in the early modern period should 
depend on an Asia-centered perspective.  These 
historians argue that some foreign groups under-
stood Japan to be an altogether too-open country.  
In other words, if certain Europeans understood 
Japan to be closed, then Ryukyu Islanders, Kore-
ans, and Ainu had a different opinion. Japan was 
not only open, but slowly expanding and at times 
highly intrusive. 
In his introduction to Visions of Ryukyu, Smits 
stakes out a decidedly Ryukyuan vantage point.  
He writes that his study "seeks to center Ryukyu 
as a historical agent, examining Ryukyu history 
mainly from the vantage point of Shuri (capital of 
the Ryukyu Kingdom), not Edo or Beijing."  
Smits accomplishes this largely through the per-
son of Sai On, a Ryukyuan ideologue and states-
man who believed that the small island kingdom 
must strive to reach a "moral parity" with Japan 
and China.  Smits explains that Sai On under-
stood that "Ryukyu's long-term survival and 
prosperity. . . depended in large part on its adop-
tion and adaptation of the Confucian way."50  
Thus, in an ironic twist, the idea of the dominant 
Japanese forcing the acculturation and assimila-
tion of neighboring people is cast in a fresh (and 
slightly uncomfortable) light: some of these 
neighbors also advocated a policy of assimila-
tion--of assimilating themselves--through the 
adoption of certain aspects of Japanese life in 
order to assure their country's survival. 
To begin with, Sai advocated a Confucian 
agenda for Ryukyuan officials that would have 
brought a grin to even the face of his stoic hero, 
Kaibara Ekken.  He believed officials should 
thoroughly familiarize themselves with the Clas-
sics; nurture a Confucian-based notion of sincer-
ity of will; employ geomancy in the construction 
of sacred and political sites; adopt Confucian no-
tions of family relations; replace certain "native" 
Ryukyuan rites with Japanese ones; and recast the 
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king as a Confucian sage.51  In one polemic, Sai 
inferred that the Satsuma conquest of the Ryukyu 
Islands had in fact benefited his kingdom.  Ryu-
kyu, under Satsuma rule, now practiced what he 
identified as "fundamental principles of the Way 
of Government."  Smits illustrates that Sai ex-
pressed his indebtedness to Satsuma in largely 
Confucian terms, believing that even the rice tax 
extracted by the powerful Kyushu domain, which 
no doubt pained the Ryukyuan countryside, had 
led to better agriculture among farmers, in turn 
leading to a "rectification" of Ryukyuan customs. 
Moreover, Sai oversaw important policy initia-
tives that in today's world might be viewed as 
traitorous to his country.  In the mid-eighteenth 
century, for example, Sai oversaw widespread 
forestry reform and the Genbun survey.  Smits 
points out that the Genbun survey, based on Japa-
nese cadastral practice, "established the basic 
economic framework for early modern Ryukyu," 
and resulted in a revision of the original cadastral 
numbers and a tightening of the central govern-
ment's control over rice-producing districts.  
However, as it did in Japan, the survey went fur-
ther than just the realm of agronomics.  As 
Smits argues, in Ryukyu it provided the govern-
ment with a means to regulate everyday life in the 
districts, which extended into the realm of "moral 
behavior" and ceremonial practice.  With in-
creased central control, Sai was able to oversee a 
crackdown on "native" Ryukyuan festival life, 
assert a ban on shamanism, and reinvent the 
original meanings of such rites as worshiping the 
hearth deity.  Of course, these measures met 
with mixed results; but the point is that some of 
the deculturation and assimilation of the Ryukyu 
Kingdom was generated internally. 52   Oddly, 
while Tokugawa officials pushed to preserve 
Ryukyuan foreignness, Sai On and others advo-
cated that country's move in the opposite direc-
tion. 
In the far north, Shakushain's seventeenth-
century struggle against Matsumae domain serves 
as another example of the historical agency of 
foreigners.  A survey of the twenty some years 
leading up to Shakushain's War demonstrates that 
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the roots of this conflict lay planted in the soil of 
cultural and ecological change brought about by 
trade with Japan.  By the late sixteenth century, 
Ainu notions of political power, social prestige, 
and ritual practice had become tied to trade with 
Japan.  That is, like the example of Sai On's re-
form policies, Ainu generated political and cul-
tural change internally.  Everything from the 
clothing that adorned powerful chiefs, to the lac-
querware cups and saké used in ceremonies, Ainu 
acquired in trade.  To obtain these items, Ainu 
brought dried fish, animal skins, and certain 
pharmaceuticals to trading posts.  Consequently, 
as certain chiefs maneuvered to extend their he-
gemony through acquiring more emblems of 
prestige, they positioned themselves to extend 
their control over the land that produced the ani-
mals whose skins purchased these goods.  Early 
on, this led to border conflicts between Ainu 
chiefdoms, including the construction of Ainu 
fortifications called casi.  In the case of Shaku-
shain's War, the two main chiefdoms involved 
were the Hae, under Onibishi (and his territory 
known as Haekuru), and the Shibuchari (or Me-
nashikuru), under Shakushain.53 
In the 1660s, Shakushain defeated Onibishi, 
but not before forcing Matsumae domain to take 
sides in the conflict.  Just prior to the outbreak 
of full-scale war, Hae Ainu sought assistance 
from Japanese miners and Matsumae domain, and 
Shakushain, viewing these events from his forti-
fied position in eastern Ezo, believed himself to 
be boxed in by hostile neighbors.  So he lashed 
out, killing just under 300 Japanese in two well-
planned assaults.  Matsumae domain dispatched 
troops to Kunnui, in eastern Ezo, to stem a poten-
tial Shakushain-led march on Fukuyama Castle, 
and at Kunnui a stalemate ensued.  Ultimately, 
the shogunate, in an unqualified example of how 
it viewed its role on the borders of the realm, dis-
patched a retainer, Matsumae Yasuhiro, to take 
over local command of military activities in Kun-
nui and see to the "subjugation of the barbarians."  
Indeed, "Campaigns to 'subdue the barbarians' 
were urgent prerogatives of the shogunate; after 
all, it was the imperial duty of the Barbarian Sub-
duing Generalissimo (seii taishogun; the formal 
imperial title of the shogun) to defend the 
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realm."54 
However, Shakushain's War also forged strong 
ethnic identities among the participants, leading 
some Japanese historians to call the conflict a 
"greater ethnic war."  Once underway, Shaku-
shain's War served to strengthen ethnic identities 
in Ezo.  Although competition for resource 
sparked the conflagration, the two sides of the 
conflict, with some important exceptions, were 
drawn along ethnic lines.  Matsumae command-
ers, such as Kakizaki Hiroshige, went so far as to 
threatened to "destroy all the Ainu."  Shakushain, 
by contrast, boasted that his forces should "slash 
their way to the Matsumae" stronghold.  In short, 
Shakushain's War took on a disturbing us-against-
them mentality, prompting the shogunate to assert 
its duty to defend the realm by conscripting sup-
port among northeastern domains under the al-
ready arcane gunyaku (military conscription) sys-
tem. 
The important point is that trade with Japan, 
and the incorporation of Japanese-manufactured 
items into Ainu politics and culture, was a power-
ful ingredient in this war and the formation of 
pan-Ainu alliances.  Moreover, at the same time 
that Japanese probably viewed themselves as 
"Japanese" while facing tenacious Ainu fighters, 
Ainu probably formed broader conceptions of 
their Ainu-ness while facing Japanese warriors as 
well.  Before and after this point in 1669, Ainu 
society remained fragmented among patrilineal 
political alignments called petiwor, or river-based 
villages and chiefdoms.  However, as Shaku-
shain watched his hunting and fishing grounds 
transform into akinaiba chigyo, or trade fiefs, 
under Matsumae's economic expansion, it forced 
him to think more bilaterally about ethnic rela-
tions on the island.  Importantly, for these Ainu, 
Japan must have been a country all too actively 
engaged with the outside world, or from Shaku-
shain's vantage point, actively conquering his 
homeland. 
Situated on the southern and northern edges of 
Tokugawa hegemony, Sai On and Shakushain 
faced the ensuing complications of an expanding 
early modern Japanese polity at different periods 
of time.  Sai On, on the one hand, resisted the 
Edo shogunate's attempts to mandate Ryukyuan 
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difference on an intellectual and political level, 
pushing the small kingdom in the direction of 
Japanese-style Confucian reform.  On the other 
hand, Shakushain resisted Japanese economic 
designs on the cold, harsh battlefields of eastern 
Ezo by attempting to create an united Ainu front 
to expel the Japanese from his homeland.   For 
these two non-Japanese societies situated on the 
fringes of the Japanese realm, Japanese expansion 
resulted in nothing less than their ultimate con-
quest and acculturation, and so, consequently, any 
characterization of early modern Japan as a 
"closed country" would have come as some sur-
prise to them. 
Such a characterization would not have sur-
prised other foreigners, however, proving once 
more that vantage point is critical to understand-
ing early modern Japanese attitudes about the 
outside world.  As mentioned, Engelbert 
Kaempfer was stationed on Deshima Islet near 
Nagasaki, (like Ryukyu and Ezo, Nagasaki was 
also an ambiguous space, with Chinese temples 
and the Chinese factory, not to mention the Dutch 
presence at Deshima).  He viewed seventeenth-
century Japan not as an expanding country but as 
a closed and highly paranoid one.  Given a 
chance, he speculated, the Japanese people would 
have lavished "the best possible treatment on us 
[Dutch visitors]," but owing to the strict prohibi-
tions against Christianity, the Edo shogunate kept 
Europeans under a watchful eye.55 
Even a superficial reading of Kaempfer's writ-
ings related to his stay in Japan (between Sep-
tember 1690 and October 1692) expose the ex-
treme steps taken by the Edo shogunate to immu-
nize Japan from any potential Christian infection.  
It is hard to overestimate the shogunate's fears of 
the monotheistic religion.  Like antibodies scur-
rying around an alien, and quite threatening, virus, 
trying to protect the larger body from infection, 
attendants and translators followed Kaempfer 
throughout his stay in Japan, making sure that he 
did not infect people, and hence the Tokugawa 
body politic, with the toxins of Christianity.   
Those Japanese who dealt with the "imprisoned 
visitors," as Kaempfer called the Dutch, were 
"bound by an oath and sign with their blood not 
to talk or entrust to us information about the 
                                                 
55 Kaempfer, Kaempfer's Japan, 285. 
situation of their country. . . ."  In others words, 
as Kaempfer concluded--in many ways setting 
the tenor in Japan and the West for nearly three 
centuries of historiography related to early mod-
ern Japan's foreign affairs and frontiers--Japan 
was a "secluded world apart from the rest of the 
world."56 
Offering much needed details on the nature of 
the Nagasaki trade, Kaempfer wrote that when 
European ships first entered the waters off Japan, 
their arrival was announced by guards called 
tomiban.  They manned watch towers to warn of 
European invasion (an invasion thought imma-
nent, incidently, after the expulsion of the mis-
sionaries).  In the case of such an invasion, sig-
nal fires would be lit in succession until the fires, 
and hence the news of the European attack, had 
reached Edo.  Later, as European ships entered 
Nagasaki harbor, they were assisted (or accosted, 
depending on your perspective) by guard boats 
called funaban.  Kaempfer described the city of 
Nagasaki as having an international flare, a prod-
uct of late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-
century trade.  Three Chinese temples (the 
Nankin, Chokushu, and Hokushu temples) graced 
the port city and upwards to 10,000 Chinese mer-
chants had once visited Nagasaki every year in 
well over 200 ships.  Some Chinese, according 
to Kaempfer, had even set up permanent resi-
dences in the city.  After 1688, however, follow-
ing shogunal suspicions that the Qing state had 
accommodated the Jesuits (the Tokugawa fam-
ily's "sworn and banished enemy"), and that 
Christian books "printed in China were hidden 
among the other Chinese volumes that annually 
arrived in the country," the Chinese trade was 
restricted and Chinese merchants themselves, 
much like Dutch merchants at Deshima, were 
forced to reside at the Chinese factory.   Al-
though the Chinese were allowed to intermix with 
the Japanese population for a longer period of 
time, in the case of the European presence, "No 
Japanese who treats the Dutch with sincerity is 
considered an honest citizen," observed 
Kaempfer.57 
Kaempfer described Deshima as a "jail" or a 
"fortified compound," one where Europeans were 
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"sealed off and guarded like thieves."  Japanese 
who worked with the Dutch were inoculated from 
foreign influence through a "Letter of Accep-
tance," wherein a guarantor promised that the 
new employee would not "listen to any talk about 
the banned Christian sect" and not "have any se-
cret discussions with the Dutch."  Even when 
traveling to Edo for a shogunal audience, Japa-
nese attendants watched over Kaempfer's every 
move, "even when stepping aside to follow the 
call of nature."  At the inns where they stayed 
along the Tokaido Circuit, "the Dutch must rely 
on the small walled garden during the day and, if 
it pleases them, the bath at night."  While travel-
ing, "young gentlemen" followed Kaempfer and 
his entourage shouting, "tojin bai bai!" (or 
"Chinaman, haven't you got something to ped-
dle!"), illustrating a curious clumping of all for-
eigners under one category of "other" in the Japa-
nese mind, hardly a quality that one expects from 
a country really open to outside contact.  Once 
at Edo Castle, much like infected people in need 
of quarantine, "Our rooms were isolated from all 
other human beings," wrote Kaempfer.   Fol-
lowing the audience, Kaempfer returned to Na-
gasaki in time to witness the execution of Japa-
nese who had smuggled with the Dutch (a com-
mon occurrence).  For the crime of illegal trade 
with the Dutch, "with neither a word nor cere-
mony," an executioner "cut off the heads of their 
charges as soon as we arrived and turned our eyes 
upon the scene."  Although the Japan trade was 
lucrative for the Dutch, their treatment at the 
hands of paranoid Tokugawa attendants and 
translators was the conduct of people who had, in 
Kaempfer's opinion, "closed their mouths, hearts, 
and souls" to their foreign guests.58 
 
Places 
Where early modern Japan did actively engage 
the outside world it often reshaped such places 
through prolonged ecological and cultural ex-
change.  John Hall, for example, has illustrated 
the importance of the copper trade in commercial 
relations between Japan and China.59  Robert 
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Innes, in his unpublished dissertation on the eco-
nomic value of such trade, argues that the conti-
nental trade led to technological advances in min-
ing in some Japanese communities.  Trade 
spurred an expansion of mining in Japan to meet 
the foreign demand.  The main reason for this 
expansion was that the major Japanese export 
specie in the early Tokugawa years (as Hall 
pointed out) was precious metals: gold, silver, 
and copper.  Facilitating the expansion of the 
mining industry, and the exploitation of these 
valuable resources, were technological innova-
tions in excavation techniques, drainage, survey-
ing, and smelting.  In short, Innes concludes that 
foreign trade "speeded the pace of innovation by 
increasing the demand first for silver and later for 
gold and copper."60  Toby echoes this point, ex-
plaining that the influence of foreign trade on the 
early modern domestic economy was several 
fold: it fostered a general advancement of the 
market economy, sparked regional industries such 
as sugar and silk, facilitated an expansion of na-
tional transportation networks, and led to market 
competition which improved the quality and in-
creased the quantity of goods.61 
Economic and technological advancement also 
transformed Japanese commercial activity be-
yond the traditional provinces.  In Capitalism 
From Within, Howell illustrates how the intensifi-
cation of cash-crop farming in the Kinai led to 
increased demand for herring-mulch fertilizer.  
This demand, in turn, sparked a massive expan-
sion of merchant-run fisheries in Ezo, transform-
ing the production habits of local Japanese and 
Ainu.  It was not long until Japanese were 
searching out fresh supplies of herring on south-
ern Sakhalin, hoping to fill the large merchant 
vessels, or kitamaebune, which followed the Ja-
pan Sea coast to ports such as Tsuruga or 
Obama. 62    Along with engendering depend-
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ency in Ainu communities by forcing them to 
labor in fisheries, however, the herring industry 
depleted fishery yield throughout Hokkaido and 
beyond.  At one point, explains Howell, herring 
shoals which migrated from the Sea of Okhotsk 
to the west coast of Hokkaido to spawn had been 
so dense that "a pole could almost stand unsup-
ported."  At these sites, gams of whales and 
flocks of seagulls gathered to feed off the concen-
tration of fish.  However, with advances in fish-
ing technology, such as the invention of the 
pound-trap, not only were small family fisheries 
unable to compete with the proto-capitalist firms 
which owned this equipment, but the environ-
ment witnessed a drastic decline in fishery yield 
by the Meiji period.63 
This type of environmental degradation and 
ecological change occurred throughout Ezo (and 
other places in Asia) with the expansion of Japa-
nese markets and trade networks.  In the early 
seventeenth century, large quantities of deer skins 
were imported into Japan from Asia, an early 
trade largely ignored by Western scholarship.  
Once in Japan, these skins were used to make 
armor and other specialty crafts such as brushes 
for calligraphy or tabi, a kind of sock worn with 
traditional Japanese footwear.  Deer-skin items 
became so popular that Japanese merchants trav-
eled to Southeast Asia in search of more skins to 
import.  Dutch records from 1624 lament that 
European traders could not get their hands on any 
decent deer skins because Japanese had bought 
them all up.  That year alone, 160,000 skins 
were imported.  It reached the point where 
Spanish observers (no doubt motivated by their 
own greed) worried that deer herds were disap-
pearing from Southeast Asia.64  John Shepherd, 
in his history of early Taiwan, points out that the 
deer skin trade with Japan also became an impor-
tant part of that island's economy under early 
Dutch and Chinese rule.65 Thus Japanese had an 
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appetite for animal skins, and as certain Asian 
markets were increasingly closed off, or as deer 
became scarce, Ezo began to supply deer skins in 
their place. 
Ainu trapped and hunted deer throughout Ezo, 
exchanging the skins with Japanese at trading 
posts.  Matsumae Norihiro, in an eighteenth-
century memorandum to Edo officials, remarked 
that trade in deer skins had depleted herds in Ezo.  
(These herds, it should be mentioned, along with 
healthy salmon runs, were closely tied to Ainu 
subsistence systems.) Norihiro was not the only 
observer to note the depletion of deer herds, how-
ever.  Five years earlier, Matsumiya Kanzan had 
briefly remarked of deer pelts that "in recent 
years none are traded."  Likewise, in 1717, a 
shogunal inspector wrote that "in past years deer 
pelts were mainly taken in the Saru River and 
Yubetsu areas, but in recent years few pelts are 
taken at all."  These are important observations 
because healthy deer herds were central to Ainu 
survival.66   
In 1792, Kushihara Seiho, a local observer in 
Ezo, offered hints as to how deer had come under 
so much pressure.  He wrote that in the fall deer 
from the mountains of the southern section of the 
Ishikari region crossed the Ishikari River and mi-
grated southeast to Shikotsu.  Illustrating eco-
logical trends in fauna distribution, he observed 
that in western Ezo the snow became very deep in 
the winter, and deer found it difficult to forage for 
food.  During this migration, when deer crossed 
the Ishikari River, Ainu concealed themselves 
and their boats behind reed blinds and waited for 
deer to cross the river so that they could overtake 
them in boats and kill them.  "In recent years an 
increasing number of deer have been taken, and 
none are left.  Those deer that did remain have 
swum across the straits to Morioka domain," 
wrote Kushihara.  Now, "there are very few if 
any deer in eastern Ezo."67 
Finally, maritime prohibitions, and Japan's 
geographic isolation from the Eurasian continent, 
shaped the disease ecology of the archipelago, 
and hence the rhythms of life and death in early 
modern Japan.  In her research on disease and 
mortality crisis in the early modern period, Ann 
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Bowman Jannetta argues that with the establish-
ment of the Edo shogunate few new diseases ac-
tually entered Japan.  Pointing to evidence such 
as the absence of bubonic plague and epidemic 
typhus, Jannetta argues that "Japan's geography 
and her isolation from the major world trade 
routes provided a cordon sanitaire that prevented 
major diseases from penetrating Japan until the 
mid-nineteenth century."68 
That is not to say, however, that certain dis-
eases did not spread outward from Japan.  Simi-
lar to the scenario outlined by William McNeill in 
Plagues and Peoples, Japanese contributed to the 
dissemination of deadly contagions in Ezo as 
their commercial and political interests advanced 
into Ainu communities.69  In Ezo, Japanese trad-
ers brought diseases such as smallpox and syphi-
lis, incorporating the northern island into the dis-
ease ecology of early modern Japan and sparking 
demographic havoc in Ainu communities. 70  
Ecologically speaking, viewed from the perspec-
tive of the epidemiologic range of Japan's disease 
ecology, Ezo was incorporated into the Japanese 
Archipelago in the early modern period via forms 
of "ecological imperialism."71  Not only were 
people moving beyond the traditional confines of 
the realm, but it seems pathogens were as well. 
 
Conclusion 
I should offer at least a brief explanation as to 
why this historiographical essay concludes prior 
to the rise of the "unequal treaty" regime negoti-
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ated between the Edo shogunate and the early 
Meiji state with the Western powers.  Quite 
simply, in my opinion, such forms of interna-
tional interaction and diplomatic order no longer 
resemble early modern forms and so are beyond 
the scope of this narrative.  As W. G. Beasley 
and, more recently, Michael Auslin point out, 
after 1855, Japan was forced to navigate within a 
new logic of foreign relations and international 
order, one not premised on the notion that Japan--
or even China for that matter--stood at the center 
of a real or imagined global community, but 
rather one that exposed that Japan sat precari-
ously on the edge of modern civilization.  As 
Auslin cautions, this is not to say that between 
1858 and 1872 the Japanese were completely 
unable to assert some political and diplomatic 
agency when negotiating with the Western pow-
ers.  For example, Japanese diplomats did suc-
ceed in shifting the location of some key treaty 
ports (along with other minor diplomatic suc-
cesses) during this early phase.72  However, the 
mere advent of such ports, not to mention the 
"unequal treaties" that made them legally binding 
and the "extraterritoriality" that made them sting, 
meant that Japan, whether it liked it or not, had 
joined the dog-eat-dog international climate of 
the late nineteenth century. 
As for the early modern period, three points 
stand out after surveying new literature on its 
foreign affairs and frontier experiences.  The 
first comes in the form of (not altogether unbi-
ased) praise: with the exception of John Whitney 
Hall's Government and Local Power in Japan, 
500-1700 and Thomas C. Smith's The Agrarian 
Origins of Modern Japan, possibly no single 
monograph on the early modern period has 
spawned the kind of explosion of historical writ-
ing as has Ronald Toby's State and Diplomacy in 
Early Modern Japan.  To different degrees, the 
writings of Howell, Morris-Suzuki and others 
expand on Toby's point that the notion of sakoku 
was highly Eurocentric and that historians need to 
focus on the Edo shogunate's relations with Asia.  
With the thesis that Japan isolated itself from all 
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foreign contact wiped clean from the deck (al-
though, as the case of Kaempfer shows, certain 
important issues clearly have yet to be swept 
away), Japan specialists have started to navigate 
entirely new waters.  For this reason, some of 
the most interesting work in early modern Japa-
nese studies relates to the subfield of foreign af-
fairs and frontiers.  At the same time, however, 
so much still could be done: multiethnic commu-
nities in Nagasaki, Japanese-trading stations in 
Korea, foreign trade and environmental degrada-
tion in Japan, early-seventeenth-century Japanese 
trading communities in Southeast Asia and their 
environmental impact, and many other topics cry 
out for investigation by talented scholars. 
Second, an interpretative gulf exists among 
scholars of early modern Japan.  Those who 
study domestic-centered topics, ranging from 
literary studies to domainal politics and econom-
ics, often sound like they are talking about a dif-
ferent country than those writing on foreign af-
fairs and frontiers.  Increasingly, historians such 
as Philip Brown, Luke Roberts, and Mark Ravina 
paint a picture of an early modern polity where 
local domains remained the most pervasive mani-
festation of the political and economic country.  
However, in the realm of foreign affairs, few 
would dispute the idea that the Edo shogunate 
maintained tight control over contact with the 
outside world, a concrete manifestation of a state 
in the process of centering power.  These two 
ideas are not mutually exclusive, but Japan spe-
cialists have yet to integrate them into one con-
vincing narrative of Japan's early modern experi-
ence.  To date, in the collective scholarship of 
Japan specialists, two political countries coincide 
and sometimes collide in one temporal and spatial 
frame.  One aim of future research should be to 
reconcile some of these differences. 
Third, the new writings on early modern for-
eign affairs and frontiers have failed to convince 
historians of the modern period of the complexity 
of Japan's pre-Meiji relations with the outside 
world.  Many modernists still slavishly use the 
"closed country" (sakoku) and "open country" 
(kaikoku) dichotomy to explain Japan's plunge 
into the modern age.  It is still common to talk 
of the "opening of the country" with Matthew C. 
Perry, and how in the 1850s Japan was forced to 
confront for the first time the practice of interna-
tional diplomacy.  This is, of course, highly mis-
leading, but it does make the task of writing 
about the Meiji years easier.  With sakoku, we 
can be told that only in the Meiji period did Japan 
master diplomacy, conduct foreign trade, conquer 
foreign lands, and develop collective philoso-
phies similar to what might be described as a "na-
tional" identity.  The next step, it seems to me, is 
to have a broader penetration of the complexity 
of early modern foreign affairs and frontiers into 
the other sub-fields of Japanese studies.  This 
would require the onerous process of rethinking 
topics such as modern Japan expansionism, but it 
would surely enrich our understanding of Japan's 
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they  “include the non-overtly sexual pictures of 
the Floating World as well as pornography.” 
Chapters 3 and 4 “offer close readings of some 
images, both overtly sexual and more subtly li-
bidinous, in order to assess their status as figures 
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